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REDESIGNING WIDESPREAD INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES: A CASE STUDY OF THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO
PANDEMIC BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
COVERAGE
Daniel Schwarcz*

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID19 a pandemic. In the subsequent two years, U.S. businesses filed well
over 2,000 lawsuits in state and federal courts seeking Business Interruption (BI) insurance coverage for closures associated with the pandemic. Notwithstanding this “nationwide flood of insurance-related
litigation,” clear answers regarding insurers’ coverage obligations remain elusive two years into the pandemic; although courts have dismissed a significant majority of these lawsuits, policyholders have
scored a meaningful number of victories in federal, and especially state,
courts. This chaotic and costly process for resolving pandemic-related
BI coverage disputes contrasts sharply with the experience of the United
Kingdom. Within eight months of the pandemic’s onset, the legal obligations of British BI insurers had been definitively resolved through a
novel “test case scheme” led by the country’s primary market conduct
regulator for financial firms, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
Focusing on these divergent experiences, this Article suggests that the
United States can substantially improve its process for resolving future
widespread insurance coverage disputes by adopting a limited reform
that is inspired by the British test case scheme. In particular, this Article
proposes that states should consider empowering their insurance department and attorney general to request that federal courts adjudicating cases raising novel coverage questions implicated in emerging and
widespread coverage disputes certify those questions to the state’s su* Schwarcz@umn.edu. The title of this Article is intended to parallel Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and American Approaches to
Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TULANE L. REV. 735 (2009), which, like this Article, examined the
U.S. and U.K. approaches to resolving insurance disputes. Whereas that article focused on individual consumer-oriented coverage disputes, this Article focuses on the resolution of widespread
coverage disputes that often implicate large and small businesses alike. For helpful guidance and
suggestions, I owe substantial thanks to Tom Baker, James Davey, Nora Freeman Engstrom,
Brian Fitzpatrick, Christopher French, Erik Knutsen, Jeffrey Stempel, and Adam Zimmerman.
Josh Hamel provided excellent research assistance.
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preme court. It concludes by suggesting that affirmative efforts by states
to encourage federal courts to certify key questions of state law could
help to promote the fair and efficient resolution of widespread disputes
even outside of the insurance domain.
INTRODUCTION
Starting in March 2020, COVID-19 fundamentally transformed life
in the United States. For innumerable businesses across the country,
these changes produced massive losses as potential customers stayed
home rather than venturing out for their food, entertainment, work,
or education.1 Faced with these shocks to their revenue and income,
many businesses looked to their Business Interruption (BI) insurers
for compensation.2 Insurers uniformly rebuffed these coverage claims,
causing thousands of disappointed policyholders to resort to coverage
litigation; many of these cases are ongoing as of April 2022.3
Although the details of these insurance coverage cases vary, they
generally turn on a subset of common legal issues. The most significant of these is whether policyholders’ pandemic-induced shutdowns,
operating modifications, or additional expenses were caused by “direct physical loss of or damage to” property.4 The centrality of this
issue stems from the fact that virtually all BI policies in the United
States include this phrase—or a close variant5—in their grant of coverage, both for ordinary BI coverage and for related coverages such as
Civil Authority and Contingent BI coverage.6 According to insurers,
this requirement is simply not met when it comes to pandemic-related
business interruption losses, which stem not from any physical altera1. Diana Farrell et al., Small Business Financial Outcomes during the Onset of COVID-19,
JPMORGAN & CHASE CO. (June 2020), www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/research/small-business/small-business-financial-outcomes-during-the-onset-of-covid-19.
2. See generally Christopher C. French, COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Losses:
The Cases for And Against Coverage, 27 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2020–2021); Erik S. Knutsen &
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected Judgment: Problematic Rush to Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic, 27 CONN. INS. L. J. 185, 198 (2020–2021).
3. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 190.
4. See id. at 231.
5. Some policies cover “direct physical loss or damage to” property rather than “direct physical loss of or damage to” property. Compare Frontier Dev., LLC v. Endurance Am. Specialty
Ins. Co., No. 1:21-cv-20611-GAYLES, 2021 WL 4127395, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2021) (policy
uses former language), with Univ. of Saint Thomas v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. CV H-202809, 2021 WL 3129330, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2021) (policy uses latter language). At least
some courts have suggested that this variation in policy language is legally significant. See, e.g.,
Seifert v. IMT Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 3d 874, 878 (D. Minn. 2021).
6. See Larry P. Schiffer, Does the Novel Coronavirus Cause Direct Physical Loss of or Damage
to Property?, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/does-novelcoronavirus-cause-direct-physical-loss-or-damage-to-property.
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tion of or damage to property, but from efforts to mitigate person-toperson transmission of COVID-19.7
In addition to this “direct physical loss of or damage to” issue, litigation of pandemic-related BI coverage in the United States raises a
host of other common issues. For instance, many cases also implicate
exclusions for losses caused by a virus, which were a common, but not
universal, feature of BI policies prior to the pandemic.8 Similarly, a
central issue in the many cases alleging that an insured’s property was
contaminated with COVID-19 is the causal connection between any
such contamination and the suspension of the insured’s business
operations.9
These legal issues have spawned a massive amount of litigation and
uncertainty in the United States. According to the COVID Coverage
Litigation Tracker maintained by the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, over 2,000 lawsuits have been filed regarding BI coverage in
connection with the pandemic as of April 2022.10 To date, these cases
have resulted in well over 500 judicial opinions, with that number sure
to swell significantly in the months and years to come.11 Notwithstanding these massive expenditures in legal and judicial resources, clear
answers about BI insurers’ coverage obligations remain elusive; although a significant majority of federal cases have been dismissed
with prejudice, more than 20% of all state court decisions on insurers’
motions to dismiss have denied them as of the two-year anniversary of
the Pandemic.12 And ultimately it is state courts rather than federal
courts that will have the final word on these disputes, given that insur-

7. See Keeping Promises Made to Main Street, Ensuring Fairness for All Customers., INS. INFO.
INST., https://fairinsure.org/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2022).
8. See John Buchanan & Suzan Charlton, Virus and Pollution Exclusions in Coronavirus-Related Business Interruption Claims, A.B.A. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/committees/insurance-coverage/articles/2020/virus-pollution-exclusions-coronavirus/
(“Some—but far from all—commercial property insurance policies contain exclusions for losses
caused by viruses.”).
9. See Alison Frankel, Plaintiffs Pushing for COVID-19 Insurance MDL: Don’t Believe Industry’s Hype, REUTERS (June 16, 2020, 3:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-insuranceidUSKBN23N39P.
10. Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, INS. LAW CTR., https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2022).
11. See Key COVID-19 Insurance Coverage Cases Tracker (US): 2020 and 2021, THOMSON
REUTERS (last visited Mar. 24, 2022), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-0249391?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true (last visited Mar. 24,
2022) (summarizing well over one hundred written judicial opinions involving pandemic BI insurance coverage).
12. Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 10.
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ers’ coverage obligations are a matter of state rather than federal
law.13
Perhaps not surprisingly given this costly and uncertain process for
resolving pandemic-related BI claims, various efforts to promote more
efficient resolution of these disputes in the United States have been
pursued. However, these efforts have largely proven unsuccessful. For
instance, in August 2020, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) rejected an effort to consolidate a broad range of federal BI coverage disputes, emphasizing potentially relevant variations
in policy language, applicable law, and factual circumstances.14 Although the MDL panel subsequently consolidated federal proceedings
in cases involving two relatively small regional insurers, Society15 and
Erie,16 most federal coverage disputes have continued to proceed individually.17 Efforts to establish MDLs or similar consolidated proceedings in individual state court systems have also proven unsuccessful.18
And while hundreds of the suits filed to date are styled as class actions, no court has, as of yet, authorized a class in any of these cases.19
In the legislative arena, various proposals to clarify insurers’ coverage
obligations through legislation with retroactive effect have also fallen
short.20
The United States’ chaotic and costly resolution of pandemic-related BI coverage disputes contrasts sharply with the experience of
the United Kingdom, a country whose legal system, insurance industry, and economy share many similarities with the United States.21
13. See KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
10–11 (7th ed. 2020).
14. See In re COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 482 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1362–63
(J.P.M.L. 2020).
15. In re Soc’y Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 3d 729
(N.D. Ill. 2021).
16. In re Erie COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (J.P.M.L.
2020).
17. See Alison Frankel, Imagining the COVID Insurance MDL that Wasn’t, REUTERS (Mar. 3,
2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-insurance-idUSKCN2AV2T4.
18. See infra Part I.B. For an overview of state analogues to MDLs, see Zachary Clopton & D.
Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 245, 245 (2020).
19. See Anne Merminod & Nigah Awj, COVID-19 Class Action Forecasts, A.B.A. (2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/publications/committee-newsletters/covid-19_class_actions_forecast/.
20. See Andrew G. Simpson, Some States Still Weigh Mandating Business Interruption Coverage, INS. J. (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/03/16/
605442.htm.
21. Compare Tom Baker, Univ. Pa., Presentation on U.S. COVID-19 Insurance Litigation and
the Future of Business Income Protection (Mar. 25, 2021), with James Davey, Professor of Ins. &
Commercial Law, Univ. Southampton, Presentation on The Impact of the FCA Test Case in the
UK and Beyond (Mar. 25, 2021).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL215.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 5

INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES

6-JUN-22

12:42

431

Within weeks of the pandemic causing widespread disruptions for
British businesses, the country’s primary market conduct regulator for
financial firms, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), announced
that it would bring a “test case” to clarify the application of various BI
insurance policies to pandemic-related losses.22 Approximately six
months later, in January 2021, the country’s high court definitively resolved this test case, answering numerous coverage questions based
on a representative sample of dozens of policy terms.23 Not only was
the judgment legally binding on the eight insurers that agreed to be
parties to the test case, but it also provided “authoritative guidance
for the interpretation of similar policy wordings and claims.”24 For
that reason, the FCA subsequently issued various directives designed
to ensure efficient claims payments by insurers, including a policy
checker, FAQs, Final Guidance, coverage calculator for policyholders,
and a “Dear CEO letter” that outlined the agency’s expectations for
how insurers must handle claims in light of the test case.25 Since about
March 2021, the coverage obligations of most U.K. insurers in most
circumstances have thus been quite clear, meaning that virtually all
British policyholders with legitimate pandemic-related BI claims have
been paid by their insurers as of April 2022.26
To be sure, there are several crucial distinctions between the British
and American pandemic BI coverage litigation. The most important is
that the FCA test case intentionally bypassed the issue that is at the
forefront of coverage litigation in the United States, as the FCA determined at the outset that policies providing only “basic cover” for business interruption “as a consequence of property damage” were
unlikely to be “oblig[ed] to pay out in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.”27 For that reason, the FCA framed its test case to focus only
on coverage issues involving policies that provided coverage for business interruption flowing from causes other than property damage,
such as the presence of disease or denial of access to property.28 Un22. See FCA Statement - Insuring SMEs: Business Interruption, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (May 1,
2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/insuring-smes-business-interruption.
23. Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd. [2021] UKSC 1, [1]–[4] (appeal taken from
Eng.).
24. Business Interruption Insurance, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (July 26, 2021), https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/business-interruption-insurance.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Letter from Christopher Woolard, Interim Chief Exec., Fin. Conduct Auth., to CEOs 1
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/correspondence/dear-ceo-insuring-sme-business-interruption-coronavirus.pdf [hereinafter FCA Dear CEO Letter].
28. The FCA referred to these policies as a “relevant non-damage business interruption policy.” See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE TEST CASE: FINALISED
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like in the United States, where policies providing this type of coverage are rare, a significant number of British insurers had issued BI
policies providing such extended coverage.29
Despite this important difference, the contrasting experiences of the
United States and the United Kingdom in addressing pandemic-related BI disputes raises an important question: Can the United States
improve its process for resolving future widespread coverage disputes
by adopting elements of the British approach?30 After all, the insurance coverage questions raised by the pandemic are hardly the first
example of widespread coverage disputes in the United States being
inefficiently resolved through hundreds of lawsuits that generate mass
uncertainty and span years, if not decades.31 And absent broad-ranging reforms, they will certainly not be the last.32 If, as appears to be
the case, the United Kingdom has developed and implemented a system for resolving such widespread coverage disputes fairly and efficiently, then it stands to reason that the United States could
potentially benefit from importing adapted versions of these reforms.
This Article explores that possibility, ultimately suggesting that
states should consider empowering their insurance regulators and attorneys general to request that federal courts adjudicating cases raising novel coverage questions implicated in emerging and widespread
coverage disputes certify those questions to the state’s supreme court.
Unlike the United Kingdom’s test case scheme, this proposal would
GUIDANCE FOR FIRMS 9 (2020), https://www.fca.org.U.K./publication/finalised-guidance/finalised-guidance-bi-test-case.pdf. See also Paul J. Covaleski, U.K. High Court Extends Reach of
Business Interruption Coverage for Policy Holders – What Do U.S. Insurers Need to Know?,
NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/covid-19-fca-business-interruption-test-case-unresolved-issue-and-wider-implications.
29. See Aaron Lapniewski et al., FCA Test Case Impact on U.S. Insurers, JD SUPRA (Oct. 20,
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fca-test-case-impact-on-u-s-insurers-79153/.
30. This is an issue I have previously explored in the context of resolving run-of-the-mill consumer-oriented coverage disputes. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83
TULANE L. REV. 735, 738–40 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution]. Adam Zimmerman has also explored how administrative agencies in non-U.S. settings
use aggregate procedures to resolve common claims, including through “test case” schemes. See
generally Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Collective Adjudication and Administrative Justice, (Loy. Law Sch. L.A., Working Paper No. 2020-04, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489399.
31. Another obvious example was the question whether and when pollution-remediation costs
associated with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) were covered by CGL policies issued in the 1970s and 1980s. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 86, 90 (2001).
32. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, Courting Disaster: The Underappreciated Risk of a Cyber Insurance Catastrophe, 27 CONN. INS. L. J. 407 (2021) [hereinafter
Abraham & Schwarcz, Courting Disaster].
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focus public state actors outside of the judiciary solely on identifying a
set of pending coverage disputes wherein the exercise of federal
courts’ long-standing certification authority would be most likely to
help resolve widespread coverage disputes. Not only could this proposal plausibly help to limit the uncertainty and costs produced by litigation like the pandemic BI coverage cases, but it could also affirm the
primacy of state rather than federal courts in deciding highly consequential and contested questions of state insurance law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing the
United Kingdom’s Financial Markets Test Case Scheme and its success in facilitating the resolution of pandemic-related BI coverage disputes.33 It contrasts this success with the relatively chaotic process for
resolving widespread coverage disputes in the United States, which
has been on full display in the context of COVID-19-related BI insurance. Part II then argues that the efficiency and clarity offered by the
British scheme for resolving widespread coverage disputes could substantially benefit U.S. insurance markets, but that key differences between the two countries’ legal and regulatory schemes complicate any
effort to import wholesale a test case scheme into the United States.34
Building on these insights, Part III advances the Article’s proposal:
that states direct their insurance departments and attorneys general to
play a key role in requesting federal courts to certify to state supreme
courts important legal issues implicated in a discrete set of existing
coverage disputes.35 Finally, the conclusion raises the possibility that
the Article’s regulatory certification proposal could prove useful
outside of the insurance arena in helping to promote the efficient resolution of widespread disputes in a way that respects the primacy of
state courts in resolving matters of state law.
I. CONTRASTING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S FINANCIAL MARKETS
TEST CASE SCHEME WITH PANDEMIC INSURANCE
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United Kingdom, insurers’ coverage obligations for pandemic-induced interruptions of their policyholders’ businesses have
largely been settled law since January 2021, a mere ten months after
the pandemic first ravaged the country and much of the rest of the
world. The story could not be more different in the United States,
where the coverage obligations of insurers for pandemic-induced
33. See infra Part I.
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part III.
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losses remain largely unsettled as of the pandemic’s two-year anniversary. This Part describes these competing trajectories in detail, laying
the groundwork for assessing whether the United States might borrow
from developments in the United Kingdom to improve its processes
for resolving widespread coverage disputes. Section A begins by
describing the resolution of pandemic BI disputes under the United
Kingdom’s unique Financial Markets Test Case Scheme.36 Section B
then canvasses the massively inefficient and indeterminate state of
pandemic BI litigation in the United States.37
A. The Resolution of Pandemic-Related Insurance Disputes in the
United Kingdom
The COVID-19 pandemic first dramatically impacted the United
Kingdom in March 2020, at around the same time that it initially
prompted widespread shutdowns in the United States.38 Within weeks
of the pandemic’s arrival in the United Kingdom, the FCA—the primary market conduct regulator of financial services firms, including
insurers, in the United Kingdom39—released a “Dear CEO” letter
that clarified the regulator’s initial assessment of insurers’ coverage
obligations with respect to BI policies.40 The April 15, 2020, letter first
conveyed the FCA’s conclusion that it had “no reasonable grounds to
intervene” in coverage denials by insurers that had issued “basic
cover, [which] do not cover pandemics.”41 Such policies, the FCA clarified two weeks later, “focused on property damage” and only cover
business interruption “as a consequence of property damage.”42
By contrast, the FCA’s April 2020 letter also suggested that the
pandemic raised numerous legitimate and complicated issues regarding the coverage obligations of British insurers that had issued BI policies triggered by causes other than property damage.43 Such
36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. Coronavirus and the Impact on Output in the UK Economy: April 2020, OFFICE NAT’L
STATISTICS (June 12, 2020), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/articles/
coronavirusandtheimpactonoutputintheukeconomy/april2020.
39. See About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.fca.org.uk/about/
the-fca.
40. See generally FCA Dear CEO Letter, supra note 27.
41. Id. at 1.
42. See FCA Statement - Insuring SMEs: Business Interruption, supra note 22.
43. See FCA Dear CEO Letter, supra note 27, at 2 (noting that “there are policies where it is
clear that the firm has an obligation to pay out on a policy,” as well as various policies where
“payment . . . may be disputed”). In order to help the FCA understand these issues and their
impact on both regulated insurers and their small business policyholders, the letter announced
the creation of a “new small business unit” within the agency. See id.
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potentially covered causes of business interruptions included infectious diseases, denial of access to property, and government-ordered
closures or restrictions.44 On May 1, 2020, the FCA announced that it
would work to “obtain a court declaration to resolve contractual uncertainty” regarding the coverage obligations of insurers that issued
such policies.45 Although the precise language of these policies varied
significantly across insurers, this action, the FCA announced, would
help limit the risk of “ongoing uncertainty for a lengthy period” for
both insurers and policyholders.46
The procedural mechanism that the FCA used to accomplish this
involved a Financial Markets Test Case Scheme that the British courts
first adopted on a pilot basis in 2015.47 The test case scheme was developed as part of larger procedural reforms designed to help ensure
that complex financial disputes could be placed on a specialized “Financial List” so that they could be assigned to judges with particularized experience in this domain.48 Financial market test cases are
available for claims within the broader Financial List “which rais[e]
issues of general importance in relation to which immediately relevant
authoritative English law guidance is needed.”49 For such cases, the
rules authorize a suit between persons with “opposing interests” who
mutually agree to participate in the proceedings so as to resolve the
unsettled question of law; there is thus no “need for a present cause of
action between the parties to the proceedings.”50 Opposing parties in
a test case, the rules specify, must also “seek to agree” to a common
set of facts for purposes of the case.51 Although the rules contemplate
that these test case litigants will generally consist of people who are or
were “actively in business in the relevant market,” they also specify
44.
45.
46.
47.

See FCA Statement - Insuring SMEs: Business Interruption, supra note 22.
Id.
See id.
The Financial Markets Test Case Scheme was first adopted on a pilot basis in PRACTICE
DIRECTION 51M-FINANCIAL MARKETS TEST CASE SCHEME ¶¶ 2.2.–.3 (2015). This pilot scheme
was subsequently revoked and replaced with a permanent adoption of the Financial Markets
Test Case Scheme in PRACTICE DIRECTION 63AA–FINANCIAL LIST ¶¶ 6.3–.4 (2020).
48. The Financial Markets Test Case Scheme was initially only adopted on a pilot basis. See
New Financial List, Financial Market Test Case Pilot Scheme and Shorter and Flexible Trial Pilot
Schemes, ALLEN & OVERY (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-andinsights/publications/new-financial-list-financial-market-test-case-pilot-scheme-and-shorter-andflexible-trial-pilot-sche. The scheme was thereafter extended for three years in 2017. See Financial Markets Test Case Pilot Scheme to Be Extended for Three Years and Expanded, HERBERT,
SMITH, & FREEHILLS (June 21, 2017), https://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2017/06/21/financial-markets-test-case-pilot-scheme-to-be-extended-for-three-years-and-expanded/.
49. See PRACTICE DIRECTION 63AA–FINANCIAL LIST, supra note 47, ¶ 6.1.
50. See id. ¶¶ 6.2–.3.
51. See id. ¶ 6.5(b).
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that “in appropriate cases,” other actors may be parties to a test case,
including regulatory bodies.52
The FCA’s test case for BI cover of pandemic-related losses was the
first case to operate under this Financial Markets Test Case Scheme.53
Throughout May 2020, the FCA set the stage for invoking this unprecedented procedure by hiring a well-regarded London law firm54 and a
high-profile barrister to assist with its efforts.55 During this time period, the FCA also broadly solicited feedback from policyholders and
insurers.56 Then, on June 1, 2020, the FCA published several proposals
for framing the test case.57 These included a representative set of policy wordings to be tested in the case, a set of several different fact
patterns involving the effect of the pandemic on impacted policyholders, and various different statements of the issues and questions that
the FCA would ask the court to resolve in the test case.58
Approximately one week later, on June 9, 2020, the FCA formally
filed its test case with the “High Court,” the equivalent of a U.S. federal district court.59 The test case named as defendants eight insurers
that had agreed to participate in the proceedings as “opposing interests” to the FCA, while making clear that the FCA would argue in the
proceedings that “subject to proof of loss and individual policy points
such as sub-limits,” the policies it identified in connection with the test
case “do respond to the events of COVID-19 and the Governmental
action responding to it in the first half of 2020.”60 At the same time,
the FCA published revised versions of the sample policy language to
be tested in the case as well as its proposed facts and list of issues and
questions for the court to resolve.61 These revisions were informed by
52. See id. ¶¶ 6.3, 6.5(a).
53. See Neill Blundell et al., Financial Services and Markets Dispute Resolution Quarterly Update: October 2020, MACFARLANES (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.macfarlanes.com/what-we-think/
in-depth/2020/financial-services-and-markets-dispute-resolution-quarterly-update-october-2020/
#Financial.
54. Herbert Smith Freehills is widely regarded as one of the leading law firms in London.
55. The lead barrister for the test case was Colin Edelman, who is widely regarded as the best
insurance barrister in the United Kingdom. See Colin Edelman QC, DEVEREUX, https://devereuxchambers.co.uk/barristers/pdf/colin-edelman (last visited Mar. 24, 2022).
56. See Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
57. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., Update on FCA Test Case of the Validity of Business
Interruption Claims (June 1, 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/update-fca-testcase-validity-business-interruption-claims.
58. See id.
59. See Claim Form, Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch, No. FL-2020-000018 (EWHC (QB) June 9,
2020).
60. See id.
61. See generally HERBERT, SMITH FREEHILLS, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE TEST CASE Representative Sample Of Policy Wordings (2020), https://
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over 270 written submissions and forty-five consultations from policyholders and other stakeholders in the preceding weeks.62
In short order, the court approved the FCA’s proposed treatment of
the case under the Financial Markets Test Case Scheme and established an expedited schedule for hearing the case.63 Given the case’s
scale, two judges were assigned to jointly handle it, as authorized by
the rules establishing the Financial List for complex financial disputes.64 Over the next several weeks, the test case proceeded at an
expedited pace, with extensive pre-trial briefing on a range of substantive issues.
During this pre-trial process, the FCA posted frequent updates
about the proceedings on its website.65 These included the final set of
approved facts to which the parties had agreed for purposes of the test
case, a final set of twenty-one policy wordings to be considered in the
case, as well as the various pre-trial arguments of the defendants and
the FCA.66 Throughout this time period, the FCA and its legal team
continued to meet with policyholders and other stakeholders to consider feedback on how to best frame their arguments so as to advance
policyholders’ interests.67 Meanwhile, the court allowed two outside
groups acting on behalf of a subset of policyholders to intervene and
present their own arguments, in addition to those presented by the
FCA.68
These pre-trial proceedings culminated with an eight-day online
trial starting on July 20, 2020.69 The two judges assigned to the case
subsequently published their decision, which spanned over 150 pages,
in mid-September 2020.70 The decision organized the relevant policies
under consideration into three broad categories, depending on the
covered cause of the business interruption: (i) “disease” wordings that
provided coverage when a business interruption was caused by a diswww.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/bi-insurance-test-case-representative-sample-of-policywordings-9-june.pdf.
62. Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
63. See Court Order ¶¶ 1–5, 10, 14–15, 20–21, 24, Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd.,
No. FL-2020-000018 (2020).
64. PRACTICE DIRECTION 63AA–FINANCIAL LIST, supra note 47, ¶ 6.5(d).
65. Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Judgment Handed Down in FCA’s COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Test
Case, HERBERT, SMITH & FREEHOLDS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://hsfnotes.com/insurance/2020/09/
15/judgment-handed-down-in-fcas-covid-19-business-interruption-insurance-test-case/.
69. See Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
70. See generally Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd. [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm)
(Eng.).
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ease; (ii) “prevention of access/public authority” wordings, which covered business interruption caused by restricted access to premises due
to public orders; and (iii) “hybrid” wordings which covered business
interruption caused by publicly-imposed restrictions related to a
disease.71
With respect to policies containing disease and hybrid wordings, the
High Court opinion largely found in favor of coverage, with several
caveats. For instance, the opinion rejected most insurers’ arguments
that their policies only covered losses directly attributable to local occurrences of a disease that were independent of the broader pandemic.72 The court did, however, reach a slightly different conclusion
for two specific policy wordings, which it interpreted to only provide
coverage if policyholders could demonstrate that COVID-19 outbreaks within the policyholders’ local proximity had caused their business interruption.73 Additionally, for several hybrid policies, the court
held that the relevant language conditioned coverage on government
shutdown orders that were issued pursuant to statutory authority, a
requirement that the court found was not met by various advisories
issued by U.K. authorities in March 2020.74
The High Court opinion interpreted the second category of prevention of access/public authority wordings more restrictively than the
other two sets of policies, with the coverage questions in these cases
turning heavily on both the specific language at issue and the insured’s
particular circumstances.75 The court held that many such policies required government orders that completely restricted physical access to
the insured premises for purposes of the insured’s preexisting business; that condition might be met, for instance, for restaurants that
were forced to convert entirely sit-in dining to take-out, but might not
be met for restaurants that maintained a significant take-out business
prior to the pandemic.76 As with the hybrid policies, the court also
found that coverage required government closures ordered pursuant
to statutory authority.77
The High Court opinion also addressed various important issues
that crosscut the three categories of policies. For instance, it rejected
insurers’ proposed interpretation of the “trends” clauses in their poli71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Case,
77.

Id. at [8].
Id. at [102], [107].
Id. at [407], [436]–[37].
Id. at [266]–[67], [294].
Id. at [306]–[502].
See Judgment Handed Down in FCA’s COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Test
supra note 68.
Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd. [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm), [121]–[22] (Eng.).
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cies to mean that insureds could only collect the amount they would
have made had the pandemic occurred but not resulted in any localized infections.78 Such trends clauses, the court emphasized, require
taking into account business trends that would have occurred in the
absence of an insured peril when calculating covered loss; in all instances, the insured peril included either the occurrence of an emergency or the presence of a communicable disease.79 The court also
rejected a similar argument based on the Supreme Court precedent,
Orient Express, which had held that there was no BI coverage for a
New Orleans hotel that was severely damaged in Hurricane Katrina
because the hotel would have experienced a complete cessation of its
business even if it was undamaged by the hurricane due to the physical damage that Katrina caused to neighboring property.80 While
opining that Orient Express was likely wrongly decided, the High
Court (which did not have authority to overturn the Supreme Court
precedent) distinguished it on the grounds that the insured peril in
that case was distinct from the “composite or compound perils” in the
policies that the court was interpreting.81
About a month after the High Court published its opinion, the Supreme Court granted motions by both the FCA and most of the defendant-insurers to hear a “leapfrog” appeal of the case that bypassed the
intermediate appeals stage.82 After hearing the appeal in mid-November 2020, the Supreme Court issued its own one-hundred-plus page
opinion on the case on January 15, 2021.83 With the issuance of its
opinion, the Supreme Court brought the test case to a final resolution
within about seven months of its filing and within ten months of the
United Kingdom being first struck by the COVID-19 pandemic.84
The Supreme Court opinion largely affirmed the trial court’s conclusions while rejecting only isolated portions of the analysis in ways
that ultimately expanded the availability of coverage for policyholders. For instance, the Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s conclusion that only closures ordered pursuant to statutory authority
could produce coverage under various prevention of access/public authority and hybrid wordings, such as “closure or restrictions placed,”
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Orient-Express Hotels Ltd. v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm),
[18], [57], [60] (Eng.).
81. Fin. Conduct Auth., [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm), [529].
82. See Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
83. See generally Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd. [2021] UKSC 1 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
84. Id. at [43].
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“enforced closure,” and “imposed” denial of access.85 While acknowledging that these wordings required a mandatory rather than advisory
public closure order, the Supreme Court held that this condition could
be met by instructions from a public authority that, in context, would
reasonably be understood as mandatory.86 Although the High Court
declined to rule on whether individual specific government announcements qualified under this test, it strongly suggested that certain specific public instructions, including orders from the Prime Minister in
March 2020 for schools and certain businesses to close, were sufficient
to produce coverage under this test.87
Similarly, the Supreme Court interpreted the prevention of access/
public authority wordings more broadly than had the High Court, rejecting the lower court’s holding that coverage under these policies
required a complete closure of the business’s premises relative to preexisting business operations.88 Instead, the Supreme Court credited
the FCA’s argument that phrases like “inability to use,” “prevention
of access,” and “interruption” could all be met even if the insured only
lost access to part of its premises as a result of a shutdown order.89 In
such cases, the Supreme Court reasoned, the insured would be completely unable to profit from the specific part of the impacted premises, even if other portions of the premises might be accessible or
capable of use.90
Several other portions of the Supreme Court opinion further benefited policyholders. For instance, the Supreme Court interpreted the
trends clauses in the underlying policies even more generously for policyholders than had the High Court, clarifying that any changes to an
insured’s business that were linked to the pandemic could not be used
to reduce recovery, as trends clauses were only meant to reduce recovery for losses wholly outside of the insured peril.91 Additionally,
the Supreme Court flatly overruled its Orient Express precedent, reasoning that a loss may be covered if an insured peril was a significant
proximate cause of the loss, even if the loss would have occurred in
the absence of the insured peril.92 Because the property damage to the
insured hotel in Orient Express was a substantial proximate cause of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
taken
90.
91.
92.

Id. at [116]–[24].
Id.
Id. at [120].
Id. at [136]–[37], [150]–[56].
Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd. [2021] UKSC 1, [136]–[37], [150]–[58] (appeal
from Eng.).
Id. at [140].
Id. at [264]–[68].
Id. at [308]–[09].
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the business’s interruption, and the damage to the surrounding property (which was not itself an insured peril) arose out of the same underlying cause (Hurricane Katrina), the loss should have been covered
even though the hotel’s business operations would also have been
completely interrupted from the surrounding property damage
alone.93
The FCA estimated that the test case ultimately helped to clarify
insurers’ coverage obligations for “some 700 types of policies held by
370,000 policyholders across [sixty] different insurers.”94 But it did not
resolve individual policyholders’ claims.95 The FCA thus took on a
leading role in facilitating the process of translating the opinion’s
holdings into the timely and accurate payment of individual policyholders’ claims.96 For instance, the FCA promptly released various directives to insurers regarding their payment obligations, including a
“Dear CEO letter” that outlined the regulator’s expectations for how
insurers must handle any outstanding claims impacted by the test
case.97 It also developed a tool to help policyholders identify, based on
their specific policy, the key implications of the test case.98 In cases
where legitimate differences remained between insurers and policyholders regarding the appropriate settlement of a claim, insureds
could have those disputes authoritatively resolved by the Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS), a government entity designed to efficiently resolve relatively small individual coverage disputes.99 As of
May 2021, British BI insurers had paid out roughly one billion dollars
to policyholders for pandemic-induced shutdowns.100
Meanwhile, the FCA’s initial assessment that there is no coverage
for pandemic-induced shutdowns under standard BI policies, which
only cover business interruption “as a consequence of property dam93. Id. at [309].
94. See Judgment Handed Down in FCA’s COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Test
Case, supra at note 68.
95. Id.
96. See Business Interruption Insurance – Policy Checker, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Jan. 29,
2021), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/business-interruption-insurance/policy-checker.
97. See generally Letter from Sheldon Mills, Exec. Dir., Fin. Conduct Auth., to CEOs (Jan. 22,
2021), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/correspondence/dear-ceo-letter-business-interruptioninsurance-january-2021.pdf.
98. See generally id. It has also produced various FAQ documents as well as a coverage calculator to help them estimate the amount that they should be able to recover from their insurers.
See Business Interruption Insurance Covid-19 Calculator, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Apr. 8, 2021),
https://covidcalculator.fca.org.uk/; see Business Interruption Insurance, supra note 24.
99. See generally Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution, supra note 30.
100. Carolyn Cohn, UK Insurers Pay 700 Mln Pounds So Far in Business Interruption Claims,
REUTERS (May 12, 2021, 11:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-insurers-pay-700mln-pounds-so-far-business-interruption-claims-2021-05-12/.
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age,” has largely been accepted with minimal challenge in the United
Kingdom.101 For instance, one of the few (if only) British cases challenging this conclusion was summarily dismissed by a court in a
lengthy opinion, even though the case involved a plausible allegation
of property damage arising out of the deterioration of the restaurantpolicyholder’s stock of food supplies when shutdowns were first implemented.102 The opinion specifically cited the FCA’s statements regarding the lack of cover under standard policies for pandemic-related
losses, emphasized that the underlying policy required “physical
rather than economic loss” in order for coverage to attach, and concluded that this requirement was not met by the “mere temporary loss
of use” of property or by the gradual deterioration of business supplies through natural means.103
B. The (Lack of) Resolution of Pandemic-Related Insurance
Disputes in the United States
Within weeks of the pandemic hitting the United States in March
2020, impacted businesses began filing claims under their BI policies.
Almost as quickly, insurers across the country started rejecting these
claims in their entirety. As described in the Introduction, a central
explanation for these coverage denials was that, according to insurers,
policyholders’ losses were not caused by “direct physical loss of or
damage” to any property.104 Unlike in the United Kingdom, where
this requirement was often eliminated through coverage extensions,
BI policies issued in the United States almost universally105 conditioned coverage on a policyholder’s business interruption being
caused by “direct physical loss of or damage to” either covered property (in the case of traditional BI coverage) or some other property
101. See FCA Statement - Insuring SMEs: Business Interruption, supra note 22.
102. TKC London Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. PLC [2020] EWHC 2710 (Comm), [119]–[31] (Eng.).
103. Id. at [118], [128].
104. See supra Introduction.
105. As noted above, some policies omitted the word “of” after “physical loss,” a distinction
that some courts have found relevant. See supra note 5. The similar language contained in different insurance policies stems in large part from the unique prominence that the Insurance Services Office (ISO) enjoys in coordinating coverage terms in the United States. See generally
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263 (2011).
Historically, insurers in many property/casualty lines of business have uniformly adopted ISOdrafted policies with little or no modification. Id. Although many insurers have increasingly departed from these standardized ISO policy forms in recent decades, they have typically retained
the core structural elements of these policies when doing so. Id. This approach has helped individual insurers incrementally adjust their coverage obligations while reducing the risk that doing
so will produce substantial unexpected consequences. Id.

R
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(in the case of extensions of BI coverage, like Civil Authority or Contingent BI coverage).106
Insurers’ refusals to cover pandemic-related BI claims were, in
many cases, substantially buttressed by coverage exclusions for losses
caused by a virus or bacteria. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) had
developed a standardized exclusion to this effect in 2006 in the wake
of the SARS outbreak.107 At that time, many insurers were concerned
about the possibility of coverage resulting from a pandemic, which
could result in highly correlated losses across policyholders.108 Insuring potentially correlated losses is much more difficult than covering
independent risks because they can result in very large aggregate
claims during a short time period.109 Such massive claims demands can
jeopardize insurers’ solvency, particularly because insurers face various practical, regulatory, and tax restrictions in attempting to establish
long-term reserves to pay for uncommon but potentially catastrophic
claims.110 However, at least in part because the ISO virus exclusion
was designed as an amendatory endorsement to commercial property
policies, some insurers neglected to include it in the policies they issued to insureds and others incorporated varying versions of the exclusion into their own policies.111
Although the central issues surrounding BI coverage in the United
States were thus much more consistent across insurers and policyholders than in the United Kingdom, the process by which those disputes
have been and are being resolved has been dramatically more cha106. See French, supra note 2, at 7–8. The relevant property that had to meet this condition
varied by coverage type: for conventional business interruption, “physical loss or damage” to the
insured’s property was required, whereas civil authority coverage focused on neighboring property, and contingent business interruption coverage looked to the property of suppliers or customers. Id.
107. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, EXCLUSION OF LOSS DUE TO VIRUS OR BACTERIA, CP 01 40 07
06, A–B (2006), https://bcms-files.s3.amazonaws.com/4NayvxOEVY-950/docs/CP0140.pdf.
108. See LARRY PODOSHEN, NEW ENDORSEMENTS FILED TO ADDRESS EXCLUSION OF LOSS
VIRUS OR BACTERIA 2 (2006), https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/wp-includes/ms-files.php?file=2020/03/ISO-Circular-LI-CF-2006-175-Virus.pdf. Podoshen explained
the virus exclusion in 2006 by noting:
DUE TO

While property policies have not been a source of recovery for losses involving contamination by disease-causing agents, the specter of pandemic or hitherto unorthodox
transmission of infectious material raises the concern that insurers employing such policies may face claims in which there are efforts to expand coverage and to create sources
of recovery for such losses, contrary to policy intent.
Id. at 2.
109. Abraham & Schwarcz, Courting Disaster, supra note 32, at 414.
110. See id. at 415.
111. Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 10.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL215.txt

444

unknown

Seq: 18

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

6-JUN-22

12:42

[Vol. 71:427

otic.112 Tracking this chaos accurately is only possible due to the efforts of Professor Tom Baker, who developed a Covid Coverage
Litigation Tracker that reports a range of data in real time regarding
these suits.113 According to the tracker, in the first two years of the
pandemic, over 2,000 lawsuits seeking BI coverage for pandemic-induced BI losses have been filed in federal and state courts.114 The rate
of lawsuit filings peaked in May and June of 2020, with nearly eighty
cases being filed on a weekly basis during this time period.115 But even
as of April 2022, it was common for numerous new coverage suits to
be filed each week.116 Moreover, approximately 20% of all suits have
been filed as putative class actions as of the two-year anniversary of
the pandemic; to date, however, no court has authorized any of these
suits as class actions.117
Consistent with the relatively uniform terms of BI policies in the
United States, the substantive issues raised by these myriad suits vary
along only a limited number of dimensions. In addition to traditional
BI coverage, many suits also seek Civil Authority coverage, which is
available when an action of a public entity prohibits access to insured
property.118 Suits often seek payment not only for loss of business income, but also for extra expenses caused by the pandemic, such as the
erection of physical barriers or the development of online ordering
platforms.119 In addition to the “direct physical loss of or damage to”
issue—which is nearly universally raised in existing suits—roughly
two-thirds of filed cases involve issues relating to virus exclusions.120
The precise language of these exclusions varies in potentially important ways across cases. For instance, some virus exclusions contain an
explicit anti-concurrent causation clause, which excludes coverage

112. One judge described the litigation as producing “a nationwide flood of insurance-related
litigation.” Blue Springs Dental Care, LLC v. Owners Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 3d 867, 869 (W.D.
Mo. 2020).
113. See Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 10.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. According to a survey conducted by the Washington Insurance Commissioner, the
vast majority of sampled policies included virus exclusions of some type. See Kreidler Finds Most
Business Insurance Policies in State Exclude Pandemic, Virus Coverage, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF
THE INS. COMM’R (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.insurance.wa.gov/news/kreidler-finds-most-business-insurance-policies-state-exclude-pandemic-virus-coverage.
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when a virus contributes in any way to a loss.121 Others are less clear
about coverage when a virus contributes only indirectly to a policyholder’s business interruption.122 In about 10% of cases, an additional
issue is potentially raised by the presence of policy language granting
specific coverage for communicable diseases.123
While judicial rulings on the merits of these suits have generally
favored insurers at the federal level, policyholders have enjoyed relative success in the smaller set of state court decisions that have been
issued as of April 2022. As of that date, nearly 800 decisions have
been issued on the merits of insurers’ motions to dismiss in pandemic
BI cases.124 A substantial majority of these rulings have favored insurers; 633 of them, or about 80%, have fully dismissed plaintiffs’ suits
with prejudice, whereas only 68 rulings, amounting to about 9% of
total decisions, have rejected insurers’ motions to dismiss in full.125
The remaining 11% of cases involve partial dismissals or dismissals
without prejudice, which are harder to interpret.126 These trends, however, are largely driven by federal court decisions, which have produced approximately 86% of decisions on the merits as of April
2022.127 Focusing only on state court decisions issued as of April 2022,
about 22% of those decisions have denied insurers’ motions to
dismiss.128
Not surprisingly, the primary substantive issue on which a significant majority of court decisions turn has been whether a policyholder’s business interruption was caused by “direct physical loss of or
damage to” property. Most judicial decisions granting insurers’ motions to dismiss have reasoned that the phrase “direct physical loss of
or damage to” requires some “visible, tangible ‘physical alteration’ to
property,” and that coronavirus is simply incapable of producing this
result.129 The courts that have resisted this logic have generally done
121. See Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 10. See generally Erik Knutson, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957
(2010).
122. See Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 10. Policies also vary regarding the
prominence of exclusionary language related to a virus, with a significant number of cases involving exclusionary language that is not specifically denominated as a virus exclusion, but that
was instead contained within a pollution or contamination exclusion. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Jeff Sistrunk, 1 Year In, Policyholders See Hope in Virus Coverage Battles, LAW360
(Mar. 8, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1358935/1-year-in-policyholders-seehope-in-virus-coverage-battles.
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so on several grounds. First, some courts have concluded that complaints including specific allegations that the coronavirus was physically present on property prior to a shutdown should be allowed to
proceed to discovery, as the presence of the virus on property could
conceivably amount to “direct physical loss of or damage to” insured
property.130 Other more expansive decisions have emphasized the disjunctive “or” in “direct physical loss of or damage to,” reasoning that
“direct physical loss” must necessarily involve scenarios where there is
no “direct physical damage” to property.131 For this reason, a business’s inability to use otherwise undamaged property due to a shutdown order or the risk of virus transmission might well constitute
“direct physical loss.”132
Because the meaning of insurance policy language is a matter of
state law, it is possible that state court decisions allowing pandemic BI
suits to proceed to discovery are more reflective of the ultimate resolution of these claims than pro-insurer outcomes at the federal level.
As with all substantive state law matters that are litigated in federal
court, federal decisions on the merits of pandemic BI claims have ostensibly been based on those courts’ “Erie guesses” about how the
underlying disputes would be resolved under the relevant state’s
law.133 But the significant differences in aggregate outcomes across
state and federal courts suggest that it is possible that these Erie
guesses have been inaccurate. This would hardly be unprecedented.
For instance, in the widespread and prolonged litigation regarding
Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurers’ coverage obligations
under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), federal caselaw initially favored insurers on
questions like whether CERCLA liability constitutes “damages because of . . . property damage” or on the meaning of the “sudden and
accidental” pollution exclusion.134 In subsequent years, however, state

130. See, e.g., Studio 417, Inc. v. Cin. Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp. 3d 794, 800–05, n.6 (W.D. Mo.
2020).
131. See, e.g., In re Soc’y Ins. Co. Covid-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., F. Supp. 3d 729,
738–39 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
132. Id. at 739.
133. See, e.g., Brunswick Panini’s, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 3d 965, 973 (N.D.
Ohio 2021); Terry Black’s Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 3d 896, 902
(W.D. Tex. 2021); Wilson v. Hartford Cas. Co., 492 F. Supp. 3d 417, 426 (E.D. Pa. 2020). See
generally John L. Watkins, Erie Denied: How Federal Courts Decide Insurance Coverage Cases
Differently and What to Do About It, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 455, 456 (2014–2015).
134. A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1991); see
also Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane Cty., 929 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Wis. 2019).
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courts increasingly reached more pro-policyholder determinations on
these issues.135
Despite the sheer number of BI coverage cases that have been filed
in the United States since the pandemic’s onset, most efforts to consolidate or otherwise promote the efficient resolution of these cases
have foundered. One important example of this trend is a holding by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation rejecting two different
motions by plaintiffs to consolidate pandemic-related BI actions
across multiple different insurers in a federal MDL.136 In rejecting
these motions, the panel emphasized that MDLs are primarily intended to promote efficiencies in discovery and pre-trial fact-finding
rather than to provide a definitive resolution of legal questions.137
This goal, the panel held, would not be promoted by an industry-wide
consolidation of federal pandemic BI claims because there was “little
potential for common discovery across the litigation” given that different insurers had issued different policies with different language in
different states.138 The panel concluded these variations in policy language and state insurance law, in particular, could ultimately prove
highly consequential to the proper resolution of individual disputes.139
In addition to emphasizing that pandemic BI disputes raised varying
legal issues and only a limited set of common factual questions, the
panel stressed the immense practical difficulties that would accompany managing a federal MDL covering all pandemic BI coverage.140
Overseeing such a mega-MDL would require establishing “a pretrial
structure to manage the hundreds of plaintiffs—many with disparate
views of the litigation—and more than one hundred insurers,” the
court stressed.141 It would also require a procedure for segmenting
hundreds of policies into groupings of policies with sufficiently similar
language.142 Although theoretically possible, any such undertaking
would take a significant amount of time, which would undermine the

135. Watkins, supra note 133, at 464; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 13, at 490.
136. In re COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 482 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1364 (J.P.M.L.
2020).
137. Consistent with this goal, actions that are transferred in connection with an MDL are
generally remanded to their original districts if they have not been resolved after centralized
pretrial proceedings.
138. In re COVID-19, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1362.
139. Id. at 1362–64.
140. Id. at 1363.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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quick resolution of these claims, yielding prolonged uncertainties for
policyholders and insurers alike.143
Federal courts have also largely refused to certify legal questions
related to pandemic BI coverage disputes to state supreme courts. The
law of virtually every state allows federal courts to certify unsettled
questions of state law to that state’s supreme court, where they can be
definitively resolved in a way that binds future courts.144 By contrast,
neither federal courts nor inferior state courts can issue rulings that
definitively resolve contested questions of state law in connection with
future cases.145 As of April 2022, only a single federal court in Ohio
has certified to a supreme court legal questions related to pandemic
BI coverage disputes.146 By contrast, numerous federal courts have
rejected plaintiffs’ requests to certify underlying legal issues to the relevant state supreme court.147 These courts have generally reasoned, or
143. Despite its refusal to consolidate pandemic BI litigation across different insurers, the
MDL panel did subsequently authorize two consolidated MDLs with respect to individual, regional insurers, Society and Erie. See In re Soc’y Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins.
Litig., 492 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1362 (J.P.M.L. 2020); In re Erie COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot.
Ins. Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1374–75 (J.P.M.L. 2020). Such insurer-specific MDLs were
sensible, according to the panel, not only because the underlying policies in these cases were
issued by a single insurer, but also because these policies contained identical or nearly identical
language. See generally supra. Just as importantly, both of the two insurers only operated across
a limited geographic scope, meaning that coverage disputes only implicated the insurance laws of
a limited number of states. See generally supra. These considerations enhanced the prospect of
common discovery and pre-trial motions while limiting many of the managerial difficulties that
would accompany an MDL involving multiple insurers or even individual insurers that operated
on a national scale. See generally supra. Consistent with this logic, the MDL panel refused to
authorize MDLs for insurers that had issued policies across broad swaths of the United States,
including The Hartford, Travelers, Cincinnati Insurance Company, and Lloyd’s of London underwriters. In re Travelers COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp. 3d 1341,
1343 (J.P.M.L. 2020); In re Cin. Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F.
Supp. 3d 1347, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 2020); In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, COVID-19
Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2020).
144. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 (2003) (cataloguing sources of
then-existing state certification procedures).
145. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology As “Law” and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1922 (2011).
146. Neuro-Commc’n Servs. v. Cin. Ins. Co., No. 4:20-CV-1275, 2021 WL 274318, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 19, 2021). The Northern District of Ohio certified the following question to the Ohio
Supreme Court:
Does the general presence in the community, or on surfaces at a premises, of the novel
coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2, constitute direct physical loss or damage to property; or does the presence on a premises of a person infected with COVID-19 constitute
direct physical loss or damage to property at that premises?
Id.
147. See, e.g., Bel Air Auto Auction, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp 3d 492, 502–03 (D.
Md. 2021); Henry’s La. Grill v. Allied Ins. Co. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1297 (N.D. Ga.
2020); Hillcrest Optical, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 497 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1208 (S.D. Ala. 2020); Real
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implicitly suggested, that basic principles of state insurance law require enforcing the plain meaning of insurance policy terms, and that
this principle is sufficient to permit resolution of the underlying disputes.148 The Ohio federal court that did certify the direct-physicalloss issue to the Supreme Court of Ohio not only framed the relevant
legal issue much more specifically, but also emphasized that “dozens,
if not hundreds of cases implicating the question certified here are
currently making their way through both the state and federal courts
in Ohio.”149 Certifying resolution of this question would consequently
“allow the Supreme Court of Ohio to decide these questions and bring
uniformity to the application of state law to these policies.”150 As of
April 2022, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not answered
this certified question.
Efforts to efficiently resolve the flood of insurance coverage disputes that are being litigated in state rather than federal courts have
also proven unsuccessful. For instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarily rejected an application by plaintiffs in a BI coverage case to exercise its unique King’s Bench Power151 to consolidate
and decide, on an expedited basis, pandemic BI coverage litigation in
the Pennsylvania state court system.152 To date, research has not uncovered any other efforts by plaintiffs or insurers to invoke the various state analogues to federal MDLs that exist in many states.153
Meanwhile, sixteen state legislatures have seriously considered bills
that would attempt to resolve pandemic BI coverage disputes, often
by requiring insurers to provide coverage for these losses irrespective
of the terms of their insurance policies.154 None of these bills have
Hosp., LLC v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. 3d 288, 293–94 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 2020);
Drama Camp Prods., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-266-JB-MU, 2020 WL 8018579, at
*4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 2020).
148. See, e.g., Bel Air Auto Auction, Inc., 534 F. Supp 3d at 504; Hillcrest Optical, Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 3d at 1208.
149. Neuro-Commc’n Servs. v. Cin. Ins. Co., No. 4:20-CV-1275, 2021 WL 274318, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 19, 2021), cert. granted, 166 N.E.3d 29 (Ohio 2021).
150. Neuro-Commc’n Servs., 2021 WL 274318, at *3.
151. Under its King’s Bench Power, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may consider an issue of
“immediate public importance,” even if there is no pending case on the matter in a lower court.
Joseph Tambellini, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 234 A.3d 390 (Pa. 2020); Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
USLEGAL, https://system.uslegal.com/state-supreme-courts/pennsylvania-supreme-court/
#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20also%20can%20take%20up%20any,to%20serve%20
for%20a%20term%20of%20ten%20year (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
152. See generally Trial Order, Joseph Tambellini, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., No. GD 20-005137,
2020 WL 7685913 (Pa. D.&C. Nov. 19, 2020).
153. See generally Clopton & Rave, supra note 18.
154. See Simpson, supra note 20. The precise language in these bills has varied. Many have
required insurers to retroactively pay claims for pandemic-linked BI losses, irrespective of a
“physical damage” requirement or (in some cases) virus exclusions. Id. Some bills would allow

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL215.txt

450

unknown

Seq: 24

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

6-JUN-22

12:42

[Vol. 71:427

passed,155 however, and most informed observers do not expect that
they will succeed in the future.156 Moreover, there is a significant likelihood that any such bill that were enacted into state law would ultimately be struck down as a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s
Contracts Clause, which prohibits any state from passing “any . . . Law
impairing the Obligations of Contracts.”157
Since the pandemic’s onset, state insurance regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) – the national
association through which state regulators coordinate many of their
efforts – have largely avoided addressing the merits of BI coverage
suits. Instead, state insurance regulators have framed these disputes as
legal rather than regulatory matters. In a few cases, however, state
insurance commissioners have expressed skepticism about policyholders’ claims, emphasizing, for instance, that “[s]tandard business interruption policies are not designed to provide coverage for viruses,
diseases, or pandemic-related losses because of the magnitude of the
potential losses.”158 Additionally, state insurance regulators and the
NAIC have taken strong public stands against any legislation that
would retroactively require insurers to pay pandemic-related BI
claims irrespective of the terms of their policies, warning that such a
measure could “create substantial solvency risks for the sector, significantly undermine the ability of insurers to pay other types of claims,
and potentially exacerbate the negative financial and economic impacts the country is currently experiencing.”159
BI insurers who pay out claims to seek reimbursement from special funds that would be funded
by all p/c insurers licensed to do business in state. Id. And some bills only apply to insureds with
employees below specified thresholds. Id.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Mark Hollmer, S&P Expects States to Lose Bids to Mandate Coronavirus Business Interruption Coverage, INS. J. (May 4, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/05/04/566978.htm.
157. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. There is a three-part test for violations of this clause: (1)
“Whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship”; (2) Is law supported by a significant and legitimate public purpose; and (3) Is the
adjustment of “the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties . . . [based] upon reasonable
conditions and . . . of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s]
adoption.” See Energy Reserves Grp, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12
(1983). But past decisions have invalidated state efforts to retroactively change terms of insurance policies due to the extent of insurers’ reliance interest. See, e.g., Hand v. Phila. Ins. Co., 973
A.2d 973, 984 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009).
158. See Jim Sams, Some Insurance Regulators Skeptical about Business Interruption Claims,
INS. J. (Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting letter from the North Carolina Insurance Commissioner).
159. See NAIC Statement on Congressional Action Relating to COVID-19, NAT’L ASS’N OF
INS. COMM’RS (Mar. 25, 2020), https://content.naic.org/article/statement_naic_statement_
congressional_action_relating_covid19.htm.
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UNITED KINGDOM’S TEST CASE SCHEME FOR
THE UNITED STATES

As Part I suggests, the United States and United Kingdom have had
dramatically divergent experiences managing pandemic-related BI
coverage disputes.160 Various differences between the two countries’
legal systems other than the test case scheme emphasized in Part I
help to explain this result. Perhaps most importantly, the national
scope of British insurance law surely facilitated a consolidated and
streamlined resolution of pandemic BI suits in that country.161 So too
did the country’s “loser-pays” rule for attorneys’ fees, which likely deterred lawsuits seeking coverage under standard BI policies that conditioned coverage on property damage.162 The broad availability of
extended coverage for business interruptions caused by diseases or
government shutdowns in the United Kingdom may also have helped
to quickly resolve pandemic BI claims by suggesting that ordinary BI
policies were not meant to cover pandemic-induced shutdowns.163 Additionally, insurance law in the United Kingdom tends to be somewhat
more literalist and contractarian than in the United States.164
But in addition to all of these factors, Part I suggests that the British
test case scheme played a significant role in helping the United Kingdom to avoid the uncertainty, cost, and inefficiencies that have characterized pandemic BI coverage litigation in the United States.165 The
British test case scheme quickly and definitively resolved a subset of
coverage disputes involving varying insurance policy formulations and
policyholder circumstances. Even more importantly, it provided definitive guidance to insurers on virtually all other contested pandemicrelated coverage issues. Armed with this guidance, the FCA provided
tailored instructions to insurers about the appropriate treatment of
pandemic-related BI claims.166
160. See supra Part I.
161. See infra Part II.B.
162. A loser-pays rule can help deter lawsuits that have a relatively low-likelihood of success.
See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorneys’ Fees in a Loser-Pays System, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1619,
1633 (2014).
163. See generally FCA Dear CEO Letter, supra note 27. The purchase of extended cover by a
small but meaningful number of businesses also allowed for British coverage disputes to be resolved in a way that simultaneously delivered significant insurance proceeds while avoiding creating solvency risks for insurers.
164. See generally Erik Knutsen, Patchwork Contextualism in the Anglo-Canadian Law of Insurance Policy Interpretation: Implications for the Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance, 68
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 415 (2015).
165. See supra Part I.
166. See supra Part I.A. See Cohn, supra note 100 (“ ‘Where we see any laggards we are taking
supervisory action,’ FCA CEO Nikhil Rathi told a hearing in parliament.”).
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Prompted by the test case scheme’s success in the United Kingdom,
this Part considers whether reforms inspired by that scheme could
benefit U.S. insurance law and regulation.167 It first describes the potential benefits of a mechanism for more quickly and definitively
resolving widespread coverage disputes in the United States, like the
pandemic BI coverage cases. While acknowledging the advantages of
deliberate decision-making that reflects wide-ranging arguments and
expertise, Section A argues that the time and resources that have been
devoted to the resolution of widespread coverage disputes in the
United States are clearly excessive.168 As illustrated by the pandemic
BI cases, most such disputes are driven principally by a manageable
subset of relatively ordinary legal, rather than factual, questions.
Meanwhile, the costs to both policyholders and insurers of prolonged
uncertainty about the ultimate resolution of widespread coverage disputes are significant. Unfortunately, Section B suggests that simply
transplanting the United Kingdom’s test case scheme into the United
States is hardly a viable option given the differences between the two
country’s legal and regulatory systems.169 Section B nonetheless helps
frame the proposal developed in Part III by offering some preliminary
thoughts on which elements of the British scheme could be adapted to
the American setting in light of these differences.170
A. Speed vs. Deliberation in Resolving Widespread Coverage
Disputes
Legal disputes are not always best resolved quickly, definitively,
and en masse. To the contrary, there are a broad array of settings in
which slow, deliberate, and individualized processes best serve the interests of justice, and even efficiency.171 Even in disputes raising
nearly identical legal questions, individualized dispute resolution can
harness the varying perspectives of numerous different judges, ultimately helping to produce more accurate adjudication of legal claims
and defenses.172 These and similar considerations help to explain why
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 45 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1669, 1669 (2017); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict
Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U.L. REV. 109, 149
(2015).
172. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Many Minds, Many MDL Judges, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 107–11 (2021).
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the U.S. Supreme Court frequently refuses to accept petitions for Certiorari on issues that have not had an opportunity to “percolate” in
the circuit courts.173 Similarly, familiar rules of civil procedure allow
only certain cases to be consolidated through mechanisms like class
actions or MDLs.174
America’s system for resolving pandemic BI coverage cases can
plausibly be defended on these grounds. The massive number of pandemic BI coverage lawsuits in the United States has allowed countless
lawyers, judges, policymakers, and academics to weigh in on virtually
every relevant aspect of this litigation over the first two years of the
pandemic.175 During this time period, plaintiffs’ lawyers have finetuned increasingly clever and nuanced arguments about why coverage
should be available, while insurers have developed their own increasingly sophisticated counter-arguments.176 Hundreds of judges have
evaluated these arguments to reach tentative assessments of their
merits, based on the specific policy language at issue and the particular circumstances of individual plaintiffs.177 Others, like legal academics and journalists, have also waded into the fray.178 Meanwhile,
various public programs have mitigated or even entirely offset potentially insured losses,179 and scientists have come to better understand
numerous potentially relevant facts regarding the transmission of
COVID-19.180
173. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 437–41
(2004).
174. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV. 1393,
1394–1401 (2019).
175. See supra Part I.B.
176. See id. Consider, for instance, one recent district court decision that adopted a novel line
of textual analysis. See Seifert v. IMT Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 3d 874, 879, 880–81 (D. Minn. 2021)
(emphasizing distinction between “direct physical loss to” and “direct physical loss of” property
and refusing to grant the insurer’s motion to dismiss because the latter phrasing could include
the inability to use property due to a shutdown order). Similarly, in recent months, some plaintiffs have argued that the physical barriers that they needed to erect to reduce the risk of transmission can themselves constitute “direct physical loss.” Id. at 880.
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. See generally Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2; French, supra note 2; see Dennis J. Wall
et al., Recent Developments in Business Litigation, 56 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L. J. 279, 295,
302 (2021).
179. See, e.g., Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, § 1600, 134 Stat. 281, 544 (providing numerous benefits to small businesses impacted by
the pandemic, including cash grants and low-interest, forgivable loans).
180. . See generally Cecconi et al., Ten Things We Learned About COVID-19, 46 INTENSIVE
CARE MED. 1590 (2020); Johanna Younghans, 12 Things Science Taught Us About COVID-19
This Past Year, U. MICH. HEALTHLAB (Dec. 23, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/
rounds/12-things-science-taught-us-about-covid-19-past-year.
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Ultimately, however, it is virtually certain that a more streamlined
and definitive resolution of pandemic-related BI coverage disputes in
the United States could have benefitted insurers and policyholders
alike. First, and most importantly, this is because the uncertainty that
has driven the widespread litigation of BI pandemic claims in the
United States is fundamentally legal rather than factual. As discussed
in Part I, the key questions in this litigation focus entirely on the
meaning of specific insurance policy terms, like “direct physical loss of
or damage to,” in the context of pandemic-induced shutdowns.181 In
virtually every state, such disputes are questions of law to be resolved
by judges.182 Of course, certain answers to these legal questions will
raise a variety of factual issues in individualized cases, such as whether
the coronavirus was present at a business when it was forced to shut
down or how a particular business’s costs and revenues were impacted
by partial shutdowns. But in most cases, clarity about the legal obligations of insurers would allow such factual questions to be resolved
through ordinary claims-management processes without the need for
litigation, as the British experience illustrates.183
When it comes to the resolution of purely legal issues like those that
are at the heart of the pandemic BI coverage litigation, the benefits of
delay and gathering alternative perspectives only go so far. To be sure,
writing a comprehensive and accurate analysis of legal issues can take
months and be substantially aided by prior legal analyses. Moreover,
allowing such questions to be resolved by only a small number of
judges is likely to increase the risk of errors.184 But accurate and compelling legal analysis virtually never takes years to draft or requires
the input of hundreds of judges, academics, and lawyers. To illustrate,
even the thorniest legal questions argued before the Supreme Court
almost always result in judicial opinions in a matter of months that are
informed by, at the outer limit, several dozen competing briefs and
directly relevant precedents.185
Moreover, while the legal issues raised by pandemic BI coverage
disputes involve some complexity, they are hardly uniquely difficult or
complex. To the contrary, the overarching principles regarding how
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Insurance policy interpretation
is a question of law.”).
183. See supra Part I.A (noting that insurers have paid claims for pandemic-induced business
interruptions without controversy once the legal questions regarding the meaning of relevant
policy terms were clarified by the Supreme Court and associated FCA guidance).
184. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 172, at 108–15.
185. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517,
525–26 (2003).
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courts should interpret insurance policy language are both well-established and regularly deployed by courts.186 In most jurisdictions, these
principles require courts to carefully read the relevant insurance policy language and to consider whether that language has a single plain
meaning as applied to the facts of the underlying dispute.187 To be
sure, the details regarding how these interpretive principles are
deployed vary across different states in many of their particulars.188
But these variations are not so significant that they preclude judges in
one state from learning from, and building upon, the insights of other
state courts that have confronted the same legal issues.
Although the language of different plaintiffs’ insurance policies and
the particular circumstances of the underlying disputes can vary, these
permutations are relatively limited in the context of widespread coverage disputes like pandemic-induced BI claims. The U.K. test case illustrates this point well: the U.K. Supreme Court was able to provide
“definitive guidance” on virtually all insurance coverage disputes in
that country by bucketing variations in insurance policy language and
factual scenarios into a limited set of categories sharing essential features.189 Any such effort would almost certainly be even easier in the
U.S. setting, where insurance policy language is typically more standardized than in the United Kingdom.190
The second key reason that streamlining the resolution of widespread coverage disputes, like the pandemic-related BI coverage liti186. Indeed, this very fact is emphasized by many of the federal courts that have refused to
certify questions relating to pandemic BI coverage disputes to state supreme courts. See, e.g., Bel
Air Auto Auction, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 3d 492, 502–04 (D. Md. 2021) (describing the interpretation of “direct physical loss or damage” in the context of pandemic BI claims as
involving the “straightforward application”).
187. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. §§ 3–4. Continuing a long tradition, academics in recent
years – including myself – have pushed for an approach to insurance policy interpretation that is
less tied to the plain language of insurance policies. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S.
Knutsen, Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach to Judicial Construction of Insurance Policies, 90 U. CIN. L. REV. 561 (2021); Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance
Policies as Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique
Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535 (2017); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007). But
this approach has not been widely adopted by courts.
188. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. a (“Under the plain-meaning approach, which
is typically followed in insurance law, courts interpret an insurance policy term on the basis of its
plain meaning, if it has one” without considering “circumstances surrounding the drafting, negotiation, and performance of the insurance policy.”); Id. § 3 cmt. c (noting that some courts do
consider customer, practice, and usage when interpreting insurance policy terms, but this “does
not, however, open the door to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ specific or subjective intent or
understanding regarding the insurance policy, such as drafting history, course of dealing, or
precontractual negotiations”).
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. See supra Part I.B.
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gation, would benefit insurance markets is that the prolonged
uncertainty produced by such contestations harm policyholders and
insurers alike. For policyholders, lack of clarity about the availability
of BI coverage can inject uncertainty into a broad range of decisions
relating to overcoming a potentially insured loss, from when to start
re-hiring, to how much to invest in alternative business models, to
whether to shutter operations permanently.191 Such uncertainty can
also impose a variety of meaningful non-financial strains on policyholders, requiring them to invest significant amounts of time and emotional energy when both are likely to be scarce due to their underlying
loss.192
The costs of uncertainty regarding widespread coverage disputes
are also significant for insurers. Unlike aggrieved policyholders, who
can at least sometimes hire attorneys on a contingency fee basis, insurers facing such widespread coverage lawsuits must spend massive
sums to defend themselves in court.193 They also may feel compelled
to devote extensive resources to managing these disputes in legislative
arenas and in the press.194 Meanwhile, the mere potential of liability
can wreak havoc on insurance markets, producing significant uncertainty regarding insurers’ financial strength195 and market value.196
This uncertainty can also impact the cost and availability of coverage
in the future as insurers brace for the possibility of adverse court outcomes by increasing premiums and deductibles.197
191. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Businesses Thought They Were Covered for the Pandemic.
Insurers Say No., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/business/business-interruption-insurance-pandemic.html; Leslie Scism, Companies Hit by Covid-19 Want Insurance Payouts. Insurers Say No, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2020, 10:24 am), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/companies-hit-by-covid-19-want-insurance-payouts-insurers-say-no-11593527047.
192. See Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution, supra note 30, at 747–48.
193. Unlike plaintiffs’ attorneys, the numerous attorneys who defend insurers against BI coverage claims are not paid on a contingency fee basis. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik,
Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers
of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 426 (1998).
194. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 240.
195. See US P/C Insurer Coronavirus Business Interruption Uncertainty Lingers, FITCH WIRE
(Mar. 9, 2021, 9:35 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/insurance/us-p-c-insurercoronavirus-business-interruption-uncertainty-lingers-09-03-2021.
196. See Julie Steinberg, Coronavirus Claims Hurt Shares of European Insurers, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 17, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-claims-hurt-shares-of-european-insurers-11597656600.
197. See Karen Epper Hoffman, A Question of Coverage: Business Interruption Claims, CORP.
FIN. EXEC. LEADERSHIP (July 21, 2021), https://www.cfo.com/risk-management/2021/07/a-question-of-coverage-business-interruption-claims/ (paraphrasing Mike Rouse, a practice leader for
insurance broker Marsh LLC as noting that uncertainty about pandemic BI claims is impacting
available coverage as well as pricing of BI policies).
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B. Practical Considerations in Adapting the British Test Case
Scheme for the United States
Section A suggests that U.S. insurance markets would have been
well served by prompter and more definitive resolution of pandemicrelated BI coverage disputes.198 Of course, the United Kingdom’s Financial Markets Test Case Scheme produced precisely these results.
But any effort to import wholesale the British scheme into the United
States faces at least two fundamental challenges: (i) the state-based
nature of U.S. insurance law, and (ii) the unique state and sector specific nature of U.S. insurance regulation.
1. Accounting for State-Based Insurance Law
The most obvious barrier to transplanting the United Kingdom’s
Financial Markets Test Case Scheme into the United States is that insurance law in the United States is a matter of state rather than federal law.199 To be sure, federal law can preempt varying state
insurance laws when it is explicitly intended to accomplish this goal.200
But the politics and history of U.S. insurance law and regulation make
any uniform federal approach to widespread insurance coverage disputes largely infeasible as a practical or political matter, at least at
present. This is particularly true given that the appropriate resolution
of insurance coverage disputes is generally understood to be a matter
of contract law, which (like insurance law more generally) has historically been set by state rather than federal law.201
Indeed, as suggested at various points in Part I, the state-based nature of U.S. insurance law helps to explain why so many efforts to
consolidate and rationalize pandemic-related BI coverage litigation in
the United States have failed.202 Although most states do adhere to a
common set of basic principles of insurance law – including the plain
language rule and contra proferentem – the details regarding how
these broad principles are implemented and how much room they
leave for extrinsic evidence and policyholder expectations do indeed
vary across different states.203 And with respect to more specific questions of insurance law, states often have differing precedents on key
issues, like the proper interpretation of “physical loss of or damage
to” property or the treatment of losses that are caused by both cov198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See supra Part II.A.
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 13, at 10–11.
See id. at 111–15.
See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 2.
See supra Part I.
See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. §§ 2–3
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ered and uncovered perils.204 These variations in state law were one
important motivating factor in the MDL panel’s unwillingness to consolidate pandemic BI coverage disputes across different insurers or
even across individual insurers that operated nationally.205 Varying
state insurance law precedents also help to explain why policyholders
and their lawyers have continued filing suits even when similar claims
have not been met with success in other states; failure in one state
does not necessarily mean that similar results will be obtained in other
states, even for nearly identical cases.
Of course, the state-based nature of U.S. insurance law would not
prevent any individual state from adopting a procedure inspired by
the United Kingdom’s test case scheme. Such a state-based regime
might not only help to efficiently and definitively resolve widespread
coverage disputes within that state’s court system, but could also plausibly limit the risk that federal courts would make incorrect Erie
guesses about the proper application of state insurance law.206 As indicated in Part I, the divergent results reached by federal and state
courts adjudicating pandemic-BI coverage cases may reflect such errant Erie guesses.207 Incorrect Erie guesses by federal courts applying
state insurance law have occurred with regularity in the past.208 By
quickly supplying definitive precedent on the proper application of
common insurance policy terms to widespread coverage claims, a
state-based scheme inspired by the United Kingdom’s test case system
might eliminate the need for federal courts to make any guesses at all
about state insurance law.209 This, in turn, would help to limit both the
204. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 13, 231–39, 256–74.
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. This risk is deeply related to the hollowing out of the state common law regarding contracts created through browsewrap, clickwrap, and shrinkwrap processes, which Samuel Issacharoff and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler have identified. See generally Samuel Issacharoff &
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600, 607–08
(2020). In particular, they note that federal courts have prevented the definitive resolution by
state Supreme Courts of the law in these areas, in large part because so many disputes involving
electronic contracting end up getting resolved though aggregate litigation in federal courts. Id. In
emerging widespread coverage disputes, a related phenomenon of federal-influence over state
law occurs, but through a different mechanism: insurers selectively choose relatively favorable
cases to litigate early in federal forums, so as to increase the chances that this federal precedent
will influence the ultimate outcome of disputes in state courts as well.
207. See supra Part I.B.
208. See id. See generally Watkins, supra note 133, at 456 (noting that “supreme courts from
different states often reach diametrically different conclusions in deciding important coverage
issues based on identical insurance policy language”).
209. Citing the lack of such state precedent that is directly on point, a number of federal
courts have abstained from ruling on these disputes. See Dianoia’s Eatery, LLC v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-787, 2020 WL 5051459, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2020) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over a BI pandemic coverage dispute because the “[c]omplaint raises novel in-
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legal uncertainty that results from errant federal Erie guesses as well
as the attractiveness of forum shopping for litigants in coverage
cases.210
Just as importantly, a state-based scheme inspired by the United
Kingdom’s test case procedure could help states wrest back control
over their insurance law from federal courts.211 As is evidenced by the
current BI pandemic litigation, the existing system results in federal
courts resolving many early cases in widespread coverage disputes212
as insurers strategically remove relatively weak state cases to federal
court and promptly seek rulings on dispositive motions to dismiss.213
These early federal decisions can have an outsized influence on the
trajectory of widespread coverage disputes, in part because federal
judges have the time and resources to write more thorough judicial
opinions than state judges.214 By short-circuiting this process, a statebased procedure modeled on the United Kingdom’s test case scheme
could allow that state’s court system to establish the appropriate interpretation of common policy terms implicated by widespread coverage
litigation at the outset of those disputes, before federal courts have an
opportunity to tip the scales in favor of their preferred interpretation
of contested policy language.215

surance coverage issues under Pennsylvania law . . . which are best reserved for the state court to
resolve in the first instance”).
210. See Watkins, supra note 133, at 456–57. See also Christopher C. French, Forum Shopping
COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Claims, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 201.
211. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1508 (1997); see also Issacharoff & MarottaWurgler, supra note 206, at 607–08; Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of
State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101, 2106–07, 2133–34 (2019) (describing how federal courts
have come to wrest control from state courts); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1423 (2006).
212. See supra Part I.
213. See Andy Lundberg, Covid Business Interruption Insurance: What Do the Numbers Tell
Us?, BURFORD Q., https://www.burfordcapital.com/insights/insights-container/burford-quarterly2021-03-covid-insurance/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022) (noting the fact that many cases filed in
state court have been removed by insurers to federal court); see Watkins, supra note 133, at 469
(“When an insurance company is sued in state court, it has a strong tendency to invoke removal
jurisdiction to move the case to federal court, if possible.”).
214. Early in the pandemic, a substantial majority of the written judicial opinions on pandemic BI coverage were penned by federal trial court judges. Such early opinions can end up
having an outsized impact on the evolution of insurance law precedent. See generally Christopher C. French, The Butterfly Effect in Interpreting Insurance Policies, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47 (2019).
215. Cf. Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 206, at 607–08 (noting the excessive influence that federal courts have had in the development of the state common law governing electronic contract terms).

R

R
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2. Accounting for the U.S. Insurance Regulatory Structure
A second major obstacle to transplanting the United Kingdom’s Financial Markets Test Case Scheme into the United States is that state
insurance regulators are less well positioned than the FCA to play a
major role in litigating coverage questions. Recall that the FCA is the
primary market conduct regulator of all financial firms operating in
the United Kingdom, including banks, insurers, and securities firms.216
Under the United Kingdom’s twin peaks regulatory model, however,
the FCA does not regulate the solvency of insurers, a task that is instead entrusted to the United Kingdom’s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), which is part of the Bank of England.217
By contrast, insurers in the United States are regulated in each state
in which they operate by a state agency that is typically devoted entirely or predominantly to insurance regulation.218 Such agencies regulate virtually all elements of insurers’ operations, including both their
market conduct and their solvency.219 They often face significant resource limitations, which can be exacerbated by state budget
shortfalls.220 They are also frequently accused of being captured by
the insurance industry, a charge whose accuracy, of course, varies
across jurisdictions and time periods.221
These fundamental differences in American and British insurance
regulatory architecture substantially complicate any proposal to entrust state insurance regulators with a role comparable to that which
the FCA played in the pandemic BI test case litigation. First, state
insurance regulators’ primary mandate to safeguard insurer solvency
could conflict with their interest in zealously representing policyholder
interests in any litigation of widespread coverage disputes.222 That, of
216. Dan Awrey, William Blair, & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There A
Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 196 (2013).
217. See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1140 (2015).
218. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum - Out of Many, One: Why the United States
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV., 2005, at 1, 67. Some states do
entrust insurance regulation to agencies with broader jurisdiction, which may include banking,
securities, or commerce more generally. See id. at 17.
219. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 13, 115–16.
220. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., IMPROVING U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 26, 28 (2017),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Improving-U.S.-InsuranceRegulation.pdf.
221. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment
Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance, in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Preventing Capture]; French, supra note 187, at 551–52.
222. This point has been prominent in the debate about banking regulatory structure. See
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 (2008); Adam

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL215.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 35

INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES

6-JUN-22

12:42

461

course, is because pro-policyholder results in such litigation could
plausibly impact insurers’ financial health.223 This possibility has no
doubt played a role in prompting some state insurance regulators to
publicly opine that the ongoing pandemic BI lawsuits against insurers
are without merit.224
Second, there is a substantial risk that industry influence could undermine state insurance regulators’ capacity to advocate for policyholders in test case litigation.225 Even apart from the risk of
conventional industry capture, political considerations could unduly
influence state insurance regulators who were called upon to play such
an advocacy role in widespread coverage litigation.226 This point is
well illustrated by the small set of cases in which state insurance regulators have actively embroiled themselves in coverage disputes.227 For
instance, in 2015 the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner directed
earthquake insurers operating in the state to pay claims by rejecting
their determination that recent earthquakes were a result of fracking
activity, which the underlying policies explicitly excluded.228 Inaccurately dubbing the link between fracking and earthquakes “unsettled
science,” the insurance commissioner threatened insurers that refused
to pay with market conduct examinations and enforcement actions.229
Third, unlike the FCA, state insurance regulators would almost certainly not have the resources or expertise necessary to coordinate and
litigate a test case involving a widespread coverage dispute like the BI
pandemic claims. Most state insurance regulators only employ a limJ. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 321, 331 (2013).
223. See generally Robert W. Klein & Harold Weston, Government Insurance for Business
Interruption Losses from Pandemics: An Evaluation of Its Feasibility and Possible Frameworks,
23 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 401 (2020).
224. See supra Part I.B.
225. See generally Schwarcz, Preventing Capture, supra note 221.
226. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116, 119 (2008).
227. Politics also likely played an important role in several northeastern insurance commissioners publicly announcing that policy terms imposing deductibles for hurricane damage were
not applicable to damage caused by superstorm Sandy because that storm did not meet the
definition of a hurricane. See Aidan M. McCormack & Robert C. Santoro, Superstorm Sandy:
States Order Insurers Not to Impose Hurricane Deductibles, DLA PIPER (Nov. 2, 2012), https://
www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2012/11/superstorm-sandy-states-order-insurersnot-to-im__/. Unlike the Oklahoma case, however, this position on the meaning of insurers’ policies seemed to reflect an accurate assessment of the law.
228. Bulletin from John D. Doak, Okla. Ins. Comm’r, to All Prop. & Cas. Insurers Licensed in
the St. of Okla. 3 (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/
030415_Earthquake-Bulletin-3-3-15.pdf.
229. See id.
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ited number of attorneys, and those attorneys specialize in regulatory
law rather than litigation.230 Asking them to take on the role of coordinating massively complex and important coverage litigation would
simply be impractical. Of course, state insurance regulators could employ private counsel to assist them with such an effort, just as the FCA
did.231 But this approach is expensive; estimates are that the cost to
the FCA of hiring lawyers to coordinate and prosecute the test case
were roughly £7.5 million.232 Although this cost can be passed on to
insurers through a special tax or assessment,233 the FCA’s substantial
budget allowed it to bear these expenses upfront without any assurances of such repayment.234 It is unlikely that state insurance regulators would be in a similar position.
A final difficulty arises less from differences in British and American regulatory structures and more from differences in the two country’s norms about the appropriate role of regulators. As noted in Part
I, many state insurance regulators take the position that their proper
role does not encompass the resolution of legal, as opposed to regulatory, questions.235 To some extent, of course, this view is an outgrowth
of existing state insurance codes, which could be amended to accommodate a state-based test case scheme. But it also reflects the strong
American belief that partisan government actors should not pick winners and losers in legal disputes.236 By contrast, the boundary line between insurance regulation and the resolution of insurance disputes
has long been relatively permeable in the United Kingdom. In particular, the United Kingdom’s Financial Ombudsman Service has long operated parallel to, and in collaboration with, British financial services
regulators to help resolve consumer disputes with financial firms.237
III.

DEVELOPING

AN

INSURANCE TEST CASE SCHEME
UNITED STATES

FOR THE

U.S. insurance law and regulation could benefit significantly from a
more efficient and streamlined system for resolving widespread cover230. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT 5 (2020),
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/publication-sta-hb-volume-one.pdf.
231. See supra Part I.A.
232. Martin Croucher, FCA Seeks to Claw Back £7.5M in Test Case Legal Costs, LAW360
(Apr. 22, 2021, 11:15 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1377742/fca-seeks-to-claw-back-75m-in-test-case-legal-costs.
233. See supra Part I.A.
234. See id.
235. See supra Part I.B.
236. ALEC Agriculture Principles, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/
model-policy/alec-agriculture-principles/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
237. Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution, supra note 30, at 735.
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age disputes. But as Part II suggests, simply transplanting the United
Kingdom’s successful test case scheme into the United States is hardly
a viable option for accomplishing this goal. Part II nonetheless offers
some key starting points for attempting to construct a politically viable scheme for rationalizing the treatment of widespread coverage disputes in the United States based on the successful British test case
scheme.238 First, any such proposal must operate at the state level and
ought to facilitate the ability of state court systems to articulate key
principles of insurance law before a significant number of federal
courts venture Erie guesses on the subject. Second, any such scheme
must require a more limited and neutral role for state insurance regulators than the role played by the FCA in the context of the British
test case scheme. To these basic principles, the more general condition
can be added that any potential reforms are more likely to prove politically viable and practically operational to the extent that they build
upon procedures and institutions that are already well-established in
states, rather than imagining the development of new and untested
procedural systems.
Starting from these conditions and drawing inspiration from the
FCA’s test case scheme, this Part advances a new proposal for facilitating the resolution of widespread coverage disputes in the United
States, like the pandemic BI coverage disputes.239 Under this proposal, state insurance regulators and attorneys general would be empowered and encouraged to request that federal courts adjudicating cases
raising novel coverage questions implicated in emerging and widespread coverage disputes certify those questions to the state’s supreme
court. The private litigants in the coverage disputes would be the principal parties charged with making arguments on the substance of the
coverage question if the trial court agreed to certify the question and
the state supreme court agreed to answer it. Thus, the role of the state
insurance regulator and/or attorney general would focus only on identifying a set of pending coverage disputes raising key legal issues implicated in a broad set of cases in federal courts and pressing those
courts to certify these questions in a coordinated fashion.
238. See supra Part II. Other commentators have also proposed that regulators should play a
more affirmative role in resolving widespread disputes. See, e.g., Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio &
Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2012) (suggesting that agencies should adopt aggregation procedures for resolving disputes in some settings); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 556–71 (2011)
(exploring ways to address procedural concerns associated with agencies using aggregate dispute
resolution mechanisms).
239. See infra Part III.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL215.txt

464

unknown

Seq: 38

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

6-JUN-22

12:42

[Vol. 71:427

Section A of this Part describes this proposal in more detail. It suggests that modestly changing the rules governing certification in a way
that is informed by the United Kingdom’s experience with its test case
scheme could dramatically improve the resolution of widespread coverage disputes in the United States while affirming the primacy of
states in setting their insurance laws.240 Section B considers potential
criticisms and complications of the proposal, acknowledging the potential that it could fail to achieve its intended goals while introducing
increased complexity and cost into an already poorly designed
system.241
A. Proposal for Regulatory Certification of Key Issues Implicated
by Widespread Coverage Disputes
One promising option for promoting the more efficient resolution
of widespread coverage disputes is for states to adapt their approach
to certification. Currently, every state allows its supreme court to answer unsettled questions of state law that are certified to it by federal
courts confronting those questions in pending disputes.242 Such certification procedures help to limit the risk that federal courts will make
incorrect Erie guesses about state law while empowering state supreme courts to determine the ultimate meaning of their state’s
laws.243 Building on the intuition that state supreme courts should be
the ultimate arbiters of contested questions of state law, some states
240. See infra Part III.A.
241. See infra Part III.B.
242. Certified questions must typically be potentially “determinative of an issue” and have no
answer from “a controlling statute or appellate decision of the other State [or the tribe].” See
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] § 2 (1995), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=6ec589f6-129c-2867-041122ed773dd31f&forceDialog=0. The manner of questions that may be certified is governed by
state statutes. Eight states and Washington, DC have adopted the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act, though other states have generally based their procedures on that act as
well. See 1995 Certification of Questions of Law Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=494b84ff-bd1f-465b-89a0ffaddf84d7b3 (last visited Mar. 25, 2022); 17A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2021). Some states have adopted certification procedures
as court rules instead. See, e.g., N.J. Court Rules, R. 2:12A-1 (2000). By 2008, only North Carolina had not adopted a certification procedure. Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North Carolina, 58 DUKE L.J. 69, 71 (2008); see also Rebecca A. Cochran,
Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2003) (cataloguing sources of then-existing state certification procedures).
243. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the
Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003); see
Watkins, supra note 133, at 484.
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even empower the courts of other states, as well as certain regulators,
to certify unsettled questions of state law posed by current cases to
their state supreme court.244 Currently, however, state approaches to
certification are entirely passive; state supreme courts respond to certification requests emanating from other court systems, but state actors do nothing to encourage the certification of key legal questions to
state supreme courts.
Increased use of certification in widespread coverage disputes holds
the potential to generate many of the same efficiencies that the test
case scheme produced for the United Kingdom. Contested questions
of insurance policy meaning in a particular state can only be definitively resolved by that state’s supreme court.245 By promptly certifying
the key legal issues implicated in a targeted set of coverage disputes to
these courts, federal courts could provide insurers and policyholders
with definitive guidance on interpretive questions generating widespread coverage uncertainty. This is both because insurance policy
terms are often relatively uniform across different insurers and because specific fact patterns commonly recur in widespread coverage
disputes.246 Indeed, these same features of insurance policy interpretation in the context of widespread coverage disputes help to explain
why the United Kingdom’s test case scheme proved so successful.247
Prompt federal court certification of the major legal questions driving widespread coverage disputes could provide an additional key
benefit: allowing states to reclaim from federal courts the practical ca244. The most notable example is Delaware, which allows the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court. See J.W. Verret, Federal vs.
State Law: The SEC’s New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court, CORP.
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 12, 12, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156527; Daniel R.
Kahan, The Administrative State(s): Delaware’s New Administrative Certification Procedure, 10 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 36 (2009); Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification
of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 192–93 (2010). Questions
certified to the SEC must typically involve adverse parties who are contesting a legal issue
before the SEC, such as a shareholder proposal to include bylaws on the corporate ballot. See
generally Verret, supra. If the Delaware Supreme Court accepts such certified questions, the
adverse parties brief and argue the case before the court; aside from requesting certification, the
SEC plays no advocacy role before the Delaware Supreme Court. See id.
245. See Watkins, supra note 133, at 484.
246. Indeed, one key feature of insurance policy interpretation is that rulings on policy meaning often have broader consequences due to the relative homogeneity of insurance policy language. See Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457,
1477–78 (2017); Chaim Saiman, Why Insurance Needs a Restatement: The Case of Settlement
Decision Law, 28 CONN. J. INS. L. (forthcoming 2022).
247. In fact, the legal clarity that certification could generate in the United States might outstrip the clarity produced by the United Kingdom’s test case scheme, as insurance policy language in the individual states tends to be more standardized than is policy language in the
United Kingdom.
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pacity to resolve important issues of state insurance law. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, certification of
state law questions by federal courts is particularly important “where,
unless there is certification, the state courts are substantially deprived
of the opportunity to define state law.”248 This can occur “when the
federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over most of the cases
presenting certain state law questions, a situation which is not unlikely
in insurance . . . law.”249
These potential benefits of certification are currently not realized
for two reasons. First, federal courts are often unwilling to certify unsettled questions of state insurance law, even when those questions
are implicated in a wide-ranging set of disputes. As described earlier,
this trend is evident in the pandemic BI litigation, where the vast majority of federal courts have declined to certify the question of
whether pandemic-induced shutdowns produced “direct physical loss
of or damage” to covered property.250 But this hesitancy by federal
courts to certify questions of insurance policy interpretation predates
the pandemic and has been evident in many of the key widespread
coverage disputes of the last several decades, such as the litigation
over CGL insurers’ responsibilities for liability under CERCLA.251
Federal courts often justify this reluctance to certify by reasoning that
insurance coverage disputes merely require the application of basic
principles of contract interpretation, which are well-settled in every
state.252
Second, even when courts do certify questions of state insurance
policy interpretation to state supreme courts, they never do so in a
coordinated fashion. To the contrary, courts determine whether to certify state law questions in isolated cases and typically only when and if
one of the parties raises the possibility.253 Courts generally have no
mechanism for certifying related questions arising in different cases,
particularly if those cases are pending before different judges. As suggested by the United Kingdom’s financial test case scheme, however,
248. Gutierrez v. Smith, 702 F.3d 103, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2012).
249. Id. at 117; see also Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 206, at 607–08 (noting the
undue influence that federal courts have had over the development of state common law regarding electronic contracts).
250. See supra Part I.B.
251. See Watkins, supra note 133, at 460.
252. Federal courts have developed various guidelines for determining when certification is
appropriate, focusing on factors like whether there is authoritative guidance from state courts on
the underlying issue, the importance of the issue to the state, and the capacity of certification to
definitively resolve the dispute. See, e.g., Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 81 (2d Cir. 2000).
253. Federal courts do have the authority to certify questions of state law sua sponte. But they
rarely exercise this authority. See Nash, supra note 243, at 1714.

R
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effective guidance on the resolution of widespread coverage disputes
may require definitive rulings on several different key policy terms or
factual scenarios; although widespread coverage disputes implicate a
small set of common policy terms and fact patterns, the central unanswered questions are rarely, if ever, all raised in a single case.254 In the
context of the BI coverage disputes prompted by the pandemic, for
instance, a supreme court decision addressing a set of closely related
issues raised in several different cases would have the best chance of
definitively resolving potential coverage disputes. These issues might
include (i) whether pandemic-induced shutdowns constitute “direct
physical loss of or damage to” property; (ii) whether close variants of
this policy language, such as “direct physical loss or damage to,” are
legally relevant; (iii) the proper treatment of causation issues involving virus exclusions; and (iv) whether the actual presence of
coronavirus inside property could impact the resolution of the foregoing issues.255
States could plausibly overcome these two obstacles by developing
an active and coordinated strategy for encouraging federal courts adjudicating cases that are part of an emerging set of widespread disputes to certify key legal issues raised in appropriate cases to the
relevant state supreme court.256 To do so, a state could direct its insurance department and/or attorney general to file certification requests
in federal cases raising complementary insurance coverage questions
that are implicated in a significant number of ongoing insurance coverage disputes and that turn on the application of that state’s insurance laws.257
Unlike existing certification procedures, which are fundamentally
reactive,258 this approach would mirror the United Kingdom’s test
case scheme by directing state actors to proactively seek resolution of
the most pressing legal questions driving widespread coverage disputes. And like the test case scheme, it would attempt to do so in part
by leveraging the insurance market expertise of state agencies. State
insurance departments are uniquely well-situated to identify emerging
legal issues having potentially significant implications for a wide range
254. See supra Part I.A.
255. See supra Part I.
256. Ideally, such certification requests could be filed not only in ongoing federal coverage
disputes, but also in coverage disputes before trial or intermediate appellate courts in the state.
But that approach may raise complicated procedural questions for each individual state.
257. In some states, insurance regulators and attorneys general might be able to file such
certification requests without the need for any statutory or regulatory reform at all.
258. See Frank Chang, You Have Not Because You Ask Not: Why Federal Courts Do Not
Certify Questions of State Law to State Courts, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 251, 269 (2017).
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of coverage disputes given their regular interactions with insurers and
policyholders. Meanwhile, state attorneys general are reasonably wellsituated to translate these views into legal filings that clearly communicate to federal courts the public benefits that could flow from certifying these questions, as well as the state’s particular interest in having
these issues definitively resolved by its own supreme court. Acting together, these two state actors could therefore plausibly perform a role
similar to the FCA’s framing of the test case litigation in the United
Kingdom.
A key difference between this proposal and the United Kingdom’s
test case scheme is that legal questions would be drawn from cases
that had already been filed in federal courts. This approach would allow advocacy on the appropriate resolution of the underlying interpretive questions to be advanced solely by the interested parties
rather than by a state agency facing potential resource and political
constraints. Interested third parties could, of course, be invited to submit amicus briefs or make special appearances, as occurred in the
United Kingdom. Structuring the proposal in this way also avoids any
potential problems with asking state supreme courts to issue advisory
opinions, an authority that is either completely foreclosed or highly
limited in most states.
B. Addressing Potential Criticisms of a Regulatory Certification
Scheme
The regulatory certification proposal developed above can, of
course, be objected to on multiple grounds. Two such objections are
particularly noteworthy: that it would make little difference relative to
the status quo, and that it could result in premature and under-developed legal opinions.
Turning to the first of these objections, it is certainly possible that
federal courts would refuse to certify the key legal issues implicated in
widespread coverage disputes to state supreme courts, despite requests to do so by state insurance departments and attorneys general.
Certification, after all, can delay resolution of the underlying case,
meaning that one or even both of the litigants may resist certification.
Moreover, regulatory certification requests would still have to grapple
with the reasoning adopted by many past federal courts that basic
principles of insurance policy interpretation are well-established
under the law of virtually every state, rendering certification unnecessary. If regulatory certification requests ultimately were infrequently
granted, then involving state insurance departments and attorneys
general in these matters would simply impose additional costs on
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courts adjudicating widespread coverage disputes and the parties litigating them without producing any meaningful countervailing
benefits.
Although this concern is certainly plausible, there is good reason to
believe that federal courts would be inclined to grant many certification requests coming from state regulators and attorneys general. Unlike private litigants, the primary interest of such public actors would
be to efficiently resolve a targeted set of legal issues so as to prevent
prolonged uncertainty about coverage in the context of a newly
emerging and widespread set of coverage disputes. The very fact that
these public actors identify a case as raising such issues would credibly
signal to the court the public benefits of certification. In doing so,
state actors could provide a powerful rejoinder to the logic that federal courts are perfectly capable of interpreting the plain meaning of
insurance policy language; certification is vital not because federal
courts cannot interpret insurance policy language well, but because
they cannot provide a definitive interpretation of this language even
though such certainty is necessary for state insurance markets to operate effectively in the context of newly emerging widespread coverage
disputes. These considerations might be particularly persuasive if state
actors were seeking to package together certification of complementary insurance law questions posed in several different cases, which
could collectively resolve related issues implicated in emerging widespread coverage disputes.
Moreover, affirmative certification requests filed by state insurance
regulators and/or attorneys general would presumably highlight for
federal courts the importance of allowing the supreme court of the
state whose insurance laws are at issue to resolve those questions.
Federal courts being asked by a litigant to certify a question of state
law rarely place significant weight on this factor, in part because there
is typically no indication in such cases that state actors actually care
about resolving the legal issue posed by the case. Affirmative certification requests filed by state actors acting under a scheme designed in
part to reinforce the primacy of states in setting their own insurance
laws would, of course, provide exactly this type of indication. Such
requests could also highlight the fact that a state’s insurance law is
comprised not only of relatively broad principles that federal courts
can apply, such as the ubiquitous plain meaning and contra proferentem doctrines, but also of highly specific rules keyed to particular
policy language. And states ultimately have the right to determine
both macro and micro principles of insurance law.
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As for the administrative costs of the proposal, while perhaps they
are not trivial, they are also not extensive. This is because the proposal
ultimately does almost nothing to alter existing legal processes for the
resolution of insurance coverage disputes. Although federal courts
typically certify questions of state law after a motion by one of the
parties, they have long enjoyed the authority to certify such questions
sua sponte. Empowering state insurance regulators and/or attorneys
general to request that federal courts exercise this authority in a
targeted and coordinated set of cases therefore merely asks federal
courts to exercise authority they have long enjoyed.259 This approach
is thus much less radical than, for instance, existing procedures that
empower regulators, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, to
directly certify certain corporate law disputes to the Delaware Supreme Court.260
The second important set of objections to a regulatory certification
proposal is that it could result in the premature resolution of complex
and varying claims by a small set of judges who have not had the benefit of fully developed precedent. Recall that similar concerns have
been advanced by scholars who are skeptical of existing aggregation
mechanisms such as MDLs.261 Ultimately, however, this is not a convincing objection to the specific regulatory certification proposal described above. Part of the explanation for this conclusion is detailed
above: widespread insurance coverage disputes turn on a discrete set
of legal, rather than factual, questions that are neither unduly difficult
nor governed by widely varying state laws.262 Moreover, the benefits
of prompt resolution of coverage disputes are significant for both policyholders and insurers alike.263
In addition to these general responses, however, the regulatory certification proposal is specifically structured to ensure that it does not
unduly tilt the balance too much in favor of speedy and non-individualized resolution of widespread coverage disputes by a small handful
of judges. Most notably, each individual state supreme court typically
has five or seven justices, and there are of course over fifty different
259. See Nash, supra note 243, at 1691–92.
260. Just as in that scheme, regulators would merely request certification from the state’s high
court on a specific set of legal issues, while leaving advocacy on the appropriate resolution of
those issues to the private parties. Of course, this proposal would differ from the SEC certification scheme in a key respect: it would allow regulators to request certification to the state supreme court of legal issues implicated in disputes that are not presently before them. Instead,
regulators would be asking a state supreme court to resolve a legal issue that is currently before
a different court and that had not previously been under the regulators’ domain.
261. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 172, at 108–15.
262. See supra Part II.A,
263. See id.
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jurisdictions. Because both the central principles of insurance policy
interpretation and the relevant policy language in most widespread
coverage disputes are largely uniform across different jurisdictions, a
state-based regulatory certification proposal would still allow for dozens of different opinions on largely overlapping issues, each one of
which would be joined by multiple judges. Just as importantly, the regulatory certification proposal developed above would not require regulators or attorneys general to seek certification immediately once a
case raising a potentially widespread coverage issue was filed. To the
contrary, state actors could well opt to intervene and seek certification
only after a critical mass of opinions addressing the issue were published. And to the extent that regulators or attorneys general prematurely sought certification, the courts to whom such requests were
directed could simply deny these requests.
To be sure, the potential benefits of a regulatory certification regime may be most significant in relatively large states. In part, this is
because the insurance departments and attorneys general offices of
such states are comparatively well-equipped to implement this proposal effectively, both by making a compelling argument for certification
in appropriate cases and by timing such requests properly. Perhaps
even more importantly, the potential benefits of a quick and global
resolution of a potentially widespread insurance coverage question
will generally be muted in smaller states, where the aggregate number
of such disputes will tend to be correspondingly limited. Moreover,
informal coordination among the attorneys that handle suits implicating a common and widespread coverage issue and the judges that hear
these suits is likely to be much easier in relatively small states.264
CONCLUSION
More than two years after the pandemic’s onset in March 2020,
there is perhaps only one single definitive conclusion that can be
drawn from the thousands of lawsuits that have been filed regarding
BI insurers’ coverage obligations: America’s system for resolving
these types of newly emerging and widespread coverage disputes is
broken. By contrast, the United Kingdom’s novel test case scheme
helped to efficiently and fairly resolve a similar set of coverage disputes. Of course, innumerable differences in the two country’s insurance markets and legal systems make any proposal to import
264. Indeed, the possibility of such informal coordination in some states was one factor that
the MDL panel cited in declining to create a national MDL for pandemic BI cases. See supra
Part I.B.
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wholesale the United Kingdom’s approach into the United States naı̈ve. But the divergent experiences with pandemic BI coverage disputes in these two countries can point to sensible reforms in the
United States that are inspired by the United Kingdom’s experience
yet tailored to reflect the unique features of U.S. insurance law and
regulation. Attempting this feat, this Article proposes that states
should empower their insurance departments and attorneys general to
pursue a coordinated strategy for requesting that federal courts
promptly certify a complementary set of key legal questions to the
relevant state supreme court for definitive resolution. This proposal
would represent only a modest alteration of existing legal principles
and institutional roles within the United States. It would nonetheless
hold the potential to produce many of the key benefits in the United
States that the Financial Markets Test Case Scheme produced in the
United Kingdom.
Although this Article has focused on the possibility of using a regulatory certification process to help resolve widespread insurance coverage disputes efficiently, it is possible that this procedural innovation
could have more wide-scale application across a broad range of substantive legal questions. In recent years, numerous commentators
have convincingly illuminated some of the deficiencies of current procedural mechanisms, like MDLs and class actions, for resolving widespread disputes like the Opioid Crisis, for example.265 One of the
consistent themes of these criticisms is that in their quest to deliver
justice efficiently, federal courts coordinating MDLs and class actions
often deprive state courts of their prerogative to define the contours
of state law. Regulatory certification procedures could potentially
help to counteract this tendency while continuing to deliver at least
some of the efficiency benefits motivating MDLs and class actions. Of
course, the potential challenges of implementing a regulatory certification scheme outside of the insurance domain are also significant and
include the fact-based nature of many such disputes as well as the potential lack of a specific state regulator who could lead such an effort.
But the success of the British test case scheme for resolving COVID19 BI insurance coverage disputes may well offer important lessons
that are not cabined to the insurance domain.

265. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (2021); Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 206, at 607–08; Fitzpatrick, supra note
172, at 107–11; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 106–07 (2017); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2,
36–52 (2019).
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